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NO-STRIKE CLAUSES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Frank H. Stewart*
" ••• About all an employer can get in exchange for his commitments in a collective agreement is continued production - no work
stoppages for the life of the agreement. Most employers assume that
they don't get even this unless the union signs a no-strike pledge and
promises that the union officials will take action against wild-cat
strikes and work stoppages. Of course, unions say that employers
get a supply of labor in exchange for their concessions in collective
agreements. But employers get no more labor now than they did
before unions existed• •••" - Charles 0. Gregoryl

O

consideration will support several promises.2 A promisor
may extract more than one promise in return for his single
undertaking to do - or not to do. It depends upon his bargaining
power. His single undertaking may be so valuable that several
promises are necessary to induce him to act, or not to act. He is
privileged to hold out for the best deal. The law does not examine
his motives or reduce his demands. And from this arises the common-law principle that one consideration may support several
promises.
This principle is sharply illustrated in the modem collective
bargaining agreement. All but one of its typical provisions run
from the employer to the union. The one affirmative obligation
which flows from the union to the employer is the no-strike pledge.
At one time collective bargaining agreements were unenforceable
because they imposed no mutuality of obligation.3 The employer
promised everything; nothing came back in return. Mutuality is
now supplied by the no-strike clause. This one promise from the
union supplies the consideration for all the others.
Although the common-law analogy sharpens the importance of
the no-strike clause, it is legally imperfect. Collective bargaining
NE

• Associate, Taft, Stettinius &: Hollister, Cincinnati, Ohio.-Ed.
1 Gregory, The Collective Bargaining Agreement: Its Nature and Scope, 1949 WASH.
U.L.Q. 3, 12.
2 RFsrATEMENT, CONTRAcrs § 83 (1932),
8 Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARv. L. REv. 171, 199-201 (1936).
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agreements are not made at common-law bargaining tables. If
they were, either party dissatisfied with the proposed bargain could
decline and walk away. These agreements are made in the context
of legislation making bargaining mandatory. 4 And, although this
legislation says neither bargainer need accept a proposal or make
a concession,5 it is administered by an agency whose regulation of
the bargaining may control the contents of the bargain. 6
But from a practical standpoint, the analogy is accurate to a
fault. The employer, like his common-law counterpart, approaches the bargaining table with an estimate of what the proposed bargain will cost. He cannot grant a wage increase, or a
pension arrangement, or any other exaction if he cannot pay the
bill. He cannot pay the bill if he cannot operate, and therefore
continued operation is central to his thinking. This may be an
automatic - and unwarranted - assumption, but it is an essential
one. The no-strike clause is how the employer secures this result
from a labor organization. For these reasons, employers insist on
inclusion of these clauses,7 and for these reasons employers take
strikes to get them.
In giving up the right to strike for a time, a labor organization
releases its strongest weapon. Sometimes it wishes it hadn't. In
labor law, as elsewhere, agreements are broken. Expediency of
the moment then gives the lie to promises of unswerving rectitude.
The strike may be openly sponsored, or it may be the work of the
capricious few, for whom the contracting union has no public
sentiment but grave disapproval. In either event, the result to the
employer is the same - the freedom from work stoppages is over.

I.
A strike in breach of contract irreparably harms the employer.
Orders are lost. Customers transfer their favor to employers who
61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a)(5), (b)(3) (1958).
61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1958), says that the obligation to bargain in
good faith does not "compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of
a concession .•. .''
6 See Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L.
REv. 1057, 1078-86 (1958).
7 Insistence on a no-strike clause is not a refusal to bargain. NLRB v. United Clay
Mines Corp., 219 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955). This article treats certain aspects of the law of
no-strike clauses in the federal courts. While it does not make policy suggestions, it must be
obvious that no-strike clauses are of little value unless they are enforced. Weak and
vacillating policies toward strikes in breach of contract invite their repetition; firm policies
lessen their incidence. These policy considerations are well set forth in Mangum, Taming
Wildcat Strikes, Harv. Bus. Rev., March-April 1960, p. 88. For a perceptive analysis, see
SLICIITER, HEALY 8: LIVERNASH, THE IMPAcr OF CoLI.ECnVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT
663-91 (1960).
4
5
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meet deadlines. The discharge of strike leaders does not end the
strike; at best, it stops future efforts. A damage action, tried years
later to the vagaries of a jury, is small recompense to the employer
denied business because he cannot deliver. Equitable relief is not
only the most appropriate remedy, but also the only effective one.
The order of the court8 compelling the union to refrain from
engaging in a work stoppage in breach of contract has, as a practical matter, the effect of immediately ending the strike. The
proposition is easy to state; it is not quite so simple to apply. Before considering the possibility of equitable relief in the federal
courts, the theory of federal pre-emption must be disposed of.

A.
The doctrine of federal pre-emption states that activity in
interstate commerce, arguably protected or prohibited by the TaftHartley Act, must first be ruled on by the National Labor Relations
Board. All other forums must stay their hands until the Board
rules on its jurisdiction to take the case, and, generally, on the
merits of the case itself. The ramifications of this doctrine are
exceedingly wide. It is a vineyard tilled well and often by others.9
For this purpose it is enough that the tangled skein of cases arising
from federal pre-emption have little application.10
Federal pre-emption appears when state courts or boards try to
rule on behavior governed by federal statute. Then the NLRB
and not the state has first authority to rule on the activity. But a
s Orders in equity against strikes run to the union, preventing it from concerted action
in publicizing, organizing, or otherwise supervising the work stoppage; they generally contain mandatory provisions requiring the union to take affirmative action, rescinding previous orders, etc. See the order in the national steel strike in 1959, United States v. United
Steelworkers, 178 F. Supp. 297, 297-98 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 271 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), a/f'd 361
U.S. 39 (1959), 58 M1CH. L. REv. 595 (1960). Such an order does not violate the involuntary
servitude prohibition in amendment XIII of the Constitution. See General Elec. Co. v.
International Union, UAW-CIO, 93 Ohio App. 139, 108 N.E.2d 211 (1952), appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 555, 110 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
9 The best of all treatments is, in my opinion, Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress,
and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 6, 269 (1959). The
important developments since Professor Meltzer's article are analyzed in Gregory, Federal
or State Control of Concerted Union Activities, 46 VA. L. REv. 539 (1960).
10 Of course, I have oversimplified. See the basic analysis in Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional Problems, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 52 (1957),
and Professor Meltzer's realistic appraisal at 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 269 (1959). For differing
aspects of the problem, see Notes, 69 YALE L.J. 309 (1959), and 69 HAR.v. L. REv. 725 (1956).
Yet the net conclusion of all this scholarship is that the courts, and not the NLRB, are
most competent to deal with a violation of contract, especially one like the no-strike clause
that goes to the heart of the agreement. Federal courts are decidedly chilly to claims of
NLRB pre-emption of their own power to adjudicate contract violations. See Lodge 12,
1AM v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
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breach of contract is of no concern to the Board. In the same statute
which enlarged the NLRB and its activities, Congress gave federal
courts authority to hear and decide cases arising from breach of
labor agreements.11 To facilitate these suits Congress removed the
usual requirements of diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy. Labor agreements were for the courts; unfair labor
practices for the Board. For this reason Congress rejected a proposal to make breach of the collective bargaining agreement an
unfair labor practice: "Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be left
to the usual processes of the law and not to the National Labor
Relations Board."12 The "usual processes of the law" certainly
include equitable relief, unless otherwise prohibited. Here, of
course, the major bar to equitable relief in the federal courts is the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.13

B.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed by Congress to eliminate
federal equity power in organizational and bargaining strikes.14
The force of these strikes depends on growing economic and
psychological momentum. An injunction snaps this force. The
injunction is especially effective when the judge is receptive to
the employer's theories of criminal conspiracy, and before 1932
federal judges were very receptive indeed. They, in effect, wrote
labor policy through ex parte orders.11s Congress concluded that the
ease with which employers obtained injunctions from friendly
judges gave them an unfair advantage in defeating organization
or in rejecting bargaining demands. Therefore Congress removed
the advantage. It did so in very broad language. Hereafter no
"court of the United States"16 could issue restraining orders or
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1958).
REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947); 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABoR•MANAGEMENT R.Er..ATIONS Am: 546 (1948) [hereinafter cited LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
The Board honors this direction. It has repeatedly said it will not adjudicate contract
violations. United Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955). The rejected proposal would also
have made it an unfair labor practice to refuse to submit an arbitrable issue to arbitration.
H.R. REP. No. 510, supra at 42; I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 546. The undesirability of bringing
agreements to arbitrate under the Board's jurisdiction was spelled out in 61 Stat. 139-40
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 154 (1958): "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize
the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation, or for
economic analysis."
13 47 Stat. 70-73 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958).
14 See GREGORY, LABOR AND TIIE LAW 455 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
15 See Note, Accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to Other Federal Statutes,
72 HARv. L. REv. 354, 355-56 (1958).
16 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U .S.C. § 101 (1958).
11

12 H.R.
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injunctions in a "labor dispute." The labor disputes insulated
from federal equity power included "any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment.
• • .''17 Congress wanted unions to come to the bargaining table
freed of equitable restraints. What then happened at the table was
the concern of the parties who sat at it. In 1932, Congress had no
further interest.
The history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in debates and reports
shows legislative desire to allow unions to bargain without hindrance from federal courts. The House Report said the object
of the bill was to "protect, first, the right of free association, and,
second, the right to advance the lawful object of the association.''18
Similarly, the Senate: "A single laborer, standing alone, confronted
with such far-reaching, overwhelming concentration of employer
power, is absolutely helpless to negotiate or to assert any influence
over the fixing of his wages or the hours and conditions of labor. " 19
These statements were mirrored in the declaration of policy which
opens the Norris-LaGuardia Act. "[U]nder prevailing economic
conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for
owners of property ... the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract ... it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the
terms and conditions of his employment.... " 20 This reads like a
faded daguerreotype today. The literature accompanying NorrisLaGuardia with its inflamed pamphleteer style is hardly in tune
·with the "economic conditions" that prevail today. The labor
organizations that faced Senator McClellan are not the fledglings
of whom Congress was so solicitous in 1932.
The 1932 Congress immunized unions from equitable remedies
to give them the power to extract an agreement in ·writing from the
employer. Congress said employer power was largely created by
governmental action; governmental action must even the odds for
the countervailing power. This it did. It went no further. It did
not intend to free unions from the one effective remedy after agree17 47 Stat. 73
18 H.R. REP.

(1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113 (c) (1958).
No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1932). The same report refers to organizational efforts to obtain favorable conditions. Id. at 9.
111 S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 9 (1932). (Emphasis added.)
20 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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ment was reached.21 Indeed, in 1932 there were few labor agreements to breach. Even the most random thought shows a vast
difference between protecting an organization from judicial interference to enhance its bargaining power and permitting that organization effectively to breach the agreement once reached. 22
Courts have nonetheless so read N orris-LaGuardia.23 I think they
are mistaken, because I do not believe strikes in breach of contract
are labor disputes as written in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 24 It
is incongruous that legislation designed to equip unions with
bargaining power should free them to breach an agreement reached
by virtue of the same legislation. Of course, it would be foolish to
deny that a literal reading of the Norris-LaGuardia Act refutes my
definition of a labor dispute. But the Norris-LaGuardia Act has
seldom been read literally. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
releaxed its bans when it has divined a subsequent - and overriding - policy. Professor Smith has truthfully remarked the act
"could be profitably re-examined in light of the fairly numerous
exceptions which the courts have engrafted upon it."25
21 Perhaps I read too much into congressional silence. Those who opposed NorrisLaGuardia urged that its provisions would prevent injunctions for breach of contract. S.
REP. No. 163, supra note 19, at 9. The majority said nothing about it.
22 See GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 14, at 455-56.
23 Before Taft-Hartley: Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939). After TaftHartley: W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954).
24 The idea is hardly original with me. See, e.g., Farrand Optical Co., Inc. v. Local
475, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 143 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Mountain States Div.
17, Communications Workers v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 F. Supp. 397 (D. Colo.
1948); Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MICH. L. REv. 635, 645 (1959).
25 Smith, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46 VA. L. REv.
195, 251 n.203 (1960). E.g., the Supreme Court has allowed an injunction against a railroad which refused to bargain with the certified representative of its employees; NorrisLaGuardia was held inapplicable on policy grounds and no other, for the Railway Labor
Act could not "be rendered nugatory by the earlier and more general provisions of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act." Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n 40, Ry. Employees Dep't, 300 U.S.
515, 563 (1937). Moreover, federal courts have jurisdiction to grant injunctions to Negro
petitioners seeking nondiscriminatory representation by their unions. The Court could
hardly be more emphatic. "If .•• there remains any illusion that under the Norris•
LaGuardia Act the federal courts are powerless to enforce these rights, we dispel it now."
Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 240 (1949); accord, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); cf. Syres v. Oil Workers Union,
350 U.S. 892 (1955) (same result under NLRA). Recently the Court authorized an injunction against a union which strikes in violation of the compulsory arbitration provi•
sions of the RLA. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S.
30 (1957). The Court assumed that read literally Norris-LaGuardia would bar equitable
relief, but the result was justified with the statement that Norris-LaGuardia and the RLA
must be accommodated "so that the obvious purpose in the enactment of each is preserved."
Id. at 40. See generally Comment, Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining the Status Quo in
Railway Labor Disputes, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 381 (1960).
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C.
But Congress in 1935 apparently thought its predecessor in
1932 had not done enough to even the scales of economic power
between organized labor and organized business. In 1932 it
denied the federal judiciary the power to supervise labor's strongest
bargaining weapon; in 1935 Congress entered the bargaining
arena, apparently forever, by requiring the employer to bargain
with a properly selected union.26 The rest is familiar history.
The negative protection of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
affirmative requirements of the Wagner Act swelled the power of
organized labor. Major industries recognized union representation - sometimes after a peaceable election, sometimes after violent
upheavals. And the collective bargaining agreement became a
common item instead of a legal freak.
Many in the Congress and elsewhere thought the objectives of
1932 and 1935 in equalizing power had outreached themselves.
After World War II it was a trifle fatuous to view unions as
creatures of underprivilege. The stereotype had outlived its
political use. A rash of nation-wide strikes in 1946 and post-war
political changes which sent conservatives back to Washington in
recognizable numbers brought matters to a head. Congress decided to examine the power relationships it created in 1932 and
1935. It did so by amending the Wagner Act; these amendments
were embodied in the Taft-Hartley Act. 27
One of Congress' principal concerns was to impose equal responsibility on both parties to a labor agreement. Employers had
always been suable for their breach, but it was difficult to sue
unions because the common law of many states required that, in
order to sue an unincorporated association, the plaintiff had to
serve each and every member - a virtually impossible task.28
Another barrier, in the federal courts, was the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. The Third Circuit, in Wilson & Co. v. Birl,29 said the NorrisLaGuardia Act prevented federal courts from issuing injunctions
to remedy breach of no-strike clauses. The Senate Report spoke
disapprovingly of this reading of the 1932 act which "insulated
labor unions, in the field of injunctions, against liability for
26 National

Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8 (5), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended,

29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (5) (1958).
27 61

Stat. 136-59 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958).
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1947); 1
29105 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939).

28 S.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

421.
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breach of contract.''30 After all, the major "advantage which an
employer can reasonably expect from a collective bargaining agreement is assurance of uninterrupted operation. . . .''31 Therefore,
in section 301 of Taft-Hartley, Congress allowed federal district
courts to hear "suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce. . . ."32 This disarmingly simple language
bore a marked resemblance to its 1946 predecessor in the Case bill,
which President Truman vetoed on the ground that it "largely
repeals the Norris-LaGuardia Act and changes a long-established
Congressional policy." 33
Read alone, 301 means just what it says - suits may be brought
to enforce labor agreements in federal courts. Federal courts may
hear these suits and grant whatever relief prayed for seems proper.
Since "suits" encompasses legal or equitable proceedings, the
federal courts should be able to issue injunctions, or to award
damages, or both.
Of course, it is not that easy. Norris-LaGuardia remains on
the books. Moreover, the NLRB is expressly authorized by the
Taft-Hartley amendments to section 10 of the NLRA34 to seek
injunctions in federal district courts for various unfair labor
practices. Do these considerations mean 301 was restricted to
damage actions? The Supreme Court said "no" in Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills. 35
The Court was there faced with a union's request for equitable
enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate, certainly a Norris30 S. REP. No.
31
REP. No.
32 61 Stat. 156
33 See Textile

s.

105, supra note 28, at 17; 1 LEGISLATIVE HlsroRY 423.
105, supra note 28, at 16; 1 LEGISLATIVE HlsroRY 422.
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1958).
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 512 (1957) (dissenting

opinion).
34 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160 (j), (l) (1958). The House counterpart of § 301
removed the prohibitions of Norris-LaGuardia in suits involving breach of a labor agreement. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1947); 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 222. The final
bill removed only the Norris-LaGuardia concepts of agency, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 160 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 510, supra note 12, at 66; I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 570. Any
negative inference that Congress thereby intended Norris-LaGuardia to remain in full
force and effect in § 301 actions is untenable, for such an inference would prove Lincoln
Mills was wrongly decided. Note also that LMRA § 208 (b), 61 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 178 (b) (1958), specifically makes Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable to national emergency
strikes.
35 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The decision inspired a great deal of writing. The legislative
background is exhaustively treated in Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the
Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1957). Professor Feinsinger
took a decidedly pessimistic view in Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era in
Collective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. REv. 1261 (1957). The best is still Professor Bunn's clear
and sensible analysis in Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction To Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 VA. L. REv. 1247 (1957).
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LaGuardia labor dispute; it granted the request. The Court found
the legislative history of 301, though cloudy and confusing,36
conveyed one dominant idea: Congress wanted labor agreements
as enforceable against unions in the courts as they always had been
against employers. It did so in a grant of general jurisdiction to
the federal courts, which were in tum authorized to weave a
federal substantive law of labor agreements. Equitable relief was
quite proper. Hadn't Representative Barden said the House
equivalent to 301 allowed damage actions and "other remedial
proceedings, both legal and equitable, as might be appropriate
under the circumstances. . . ."?37
Norris-LaGuardia was no problem. "The failure to arbitrate
was not a part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act was
aimed.''38 But Congress had not discussed enforcement of agreements to arbitrate in 1947; it spoke specifically of no-strike clauses
and generally of enforcing labor agreements. Again, no problem.
The agreement to arbitrate is "the quid pro quo for an agreement
not to strike."89 Since Congress wanted no-strike clauses enforced,
it must have intended equal fare for the concomitant pledge. And
then, at the end of a very artful opinion, the Court iced the cake:
it saw "no justification in policy for restricting section 301 (a) to
• ...."40
d amage smts
II.

Congress in 1947 invited employers to enforce no-strike clauses
in the federal courts. Lincoln Mills said arbitration, the natural
correlative of the no-strike clause, could be enforced by federal
equity powers. Since equity could bind the correlative, could it
bind the first principle? It could in the Tenth Circuit; 41 it could
not in the Second.42
In the Tenth Circuit the Teamsters violated their agreement
not to strike against the Yellow Transit Company. In the lower
88 9ll CoNG. REc. ll656-57 (1947), cited in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448,456 (1957).
87Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
88 Id. at 458.
39 Id. at 455.
40 Id. at 458. {Emphasis added.)
41 Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.),
cert. granted, 364 U.S. 931 (1960).
42 A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Union, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 9ll2 (1958), 56 MICH. L. REv. 1205 (1958). Professor Cox observes that the denial of
certiorari in the Bull case is of even less than usual significance because of the Court's
strong policy of refusing to review interlocutory orders. Cox, Current Problems in the
Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RoCK.Y MT. L. REv. 247, 253 n.38 (1958).
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court the employer asked for, and got, an order restraining the
strike. The Tenth Circuit held it was properly issued. There
were several ways for the court to read section 301 with the
N orris-LaGuardia Act:

I. A breach of contract is not the type of labor dispute
the 1932 Congress had in mind. Norris-LaGuardia does not
apply.
2. A strike is a strike. By definition it is a labor dispute.
Its origin makes no difference. Norris-LaGuardia prohibits
an equitable order.
3. Section 301 is a grant of general jurisdiction. The
sweeping prohibitions of Norris-LaGuardia cannot hamper
the aims of equal enforceability 301 was intended to encourage. Where the two conflict 301 prevails.43
The Tenth Circuit favored the last view. It assumed 301 does not
restore unlimited equity powers to the federal courts where the
suit involves an employer and a labor organization.44 The court
saw a vital difference in a negative order enjoining strikes to
achieve a labor agreement and an affirmative decree making unions
honor their agreements.
"It is one thing to utilize an injunctive decree for the
negative purpose of interfering with full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of representatives to
negotiate the terms and conditions of employment. It is
quite another to utilize the judicial processes to preserve and
vouchsafe the fruits of a bargain which the parties have freely
arrived at through the exercise of collective bargaining
rights." 45
43 See
44 282

Comment, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 496, 497 (1958).
F.2d at 349.
45 Id. at 349-50.
On December 2, 1960 the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky issued a
preliminary injunction enjoining a slowdown in breach of a clause prohibiting "interrup•
tion or impeding of work, work stoppage, strike. . . ." American Radiator &: Standard
Sanitary Corp. v. International Molders &: Foundry Workers, Civil No. 4051, W.D. Ky.,
Dec. 2, 1960. In issuing the preliminary injunction the court specifically found in its
conclusions of law that the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were "inapplicable to
this suit under Section 301 [of the LMRA] .•. for violation of a contract between an
employer and a labor organization ... to enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement through injunctive process." Accord, American Chain &: Cable Co. v. United
Steelworkers, Civil No. 60-793, W.D. Pa., Dec. 12, 1960; contra, Baltimore Contractors, Inc.
v. Carpenters' District Council, 188 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. La. 1960). The district court in the
American-Standard case also cited the defendant unions for civil contempt when they
refused to abide by the preliminary injunction and end the slowdown. American Radiator
&: Standard Sanitary Corp. v. International Molders &: Foundry Workers, Civil No. 4051,
W.D. Ky., Dec. 23, 1960.
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The result is correct. It should be sustained by the Supreme
Court. If, as the Supreme Court believes, the no-strike clause is
the quid pro quo for an agreement to arbitrate - and both were
present in Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc.,
it is obvious "that the no-strike clause is no real 'quid pro quo' for
an arbitration provision unless it is specifically enforceable by the
employer, just as the arbitration clause is specifically enforceable
by the union...." 46 The result is consonant with Lincoln Mills;
it does no violence to the principles of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Norris-LaGuardia was devised to prevent judges from reading their
own social and economic views into labor law. A federal judge
has no carte blanche when asked to enjoin a breach of a labor agreement. He reads the agreement, he decides if the breach is material,
and, perhaps, if it is justified by a prior breach. Then he decides
if the breach warrants relief in equity. He is confined to enforcing
a voluntary undertaking. He is restricted to what the litigants have
written. His opinions on the wisdom of the agreement are of no
importance.
I believe a flat holding that breach of contract is not a NorrisLaGuardia labor dispute would sustain Yellow Transit but would
provide a far cleaner reading of the exact limits of 301 in relation
to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Perhaps this avenue is unlikely.
The view prevails that collective bargaining agreements are unique
commitments that have no relationship to common law contracts.
The Supreme Court finds this view to its liking.47 And the
flexible attitude advanced by the Tenth Circuit gives courts wide
latitude in laying down a federal common law of labor agreements.
And this is, after all, the net result of Lincoln Mills.
Yellow Transit applies the principles of equity announced by
Professor Chafee.48 It was his view that it was a mistake to read
the Norris-LaGuardia Act as depriving federal courts of "power"
to issue equitable orders. All courts have "power" when they
acquire jurisdiction over the person and over the subject matter.
Courts may, of course, be reversed; but on appeal the issue is
whether the issuance of the equity order was ·wrong - not whether
Others agree that no-strike clauses should be specifically enforced in the federal courts.
op. cit. supra note 14, at 455-56; Cox, supra note 42, at 252-56; Hays, The
Supreme Court and Labor Law, October Term, 1959, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 901, 918 (1960);
Comment, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 496,506 (1958).
GREGORY,

40 Hays, supra note 45, at 918.
41 lbid.
48 CHAFEE, SOllrE PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 364-80 (1950).
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the order was void ab initio due to lack of jurisdiction. In short,
Norris-LaGuardia merely lays down "right principles for [the
courts'] decision." 49 The act does not withdraw the power to hear
and determine disputes and, if necessary, to remedy them with
orders in equity. "Right principles for decision" require equal
enforcement of the obligations accepted. The Norris-LaGuardia
Act's emphasis on voluntary settlement of labor disputes enforces
this reasoning. True, this application of Chafee's view is foreign
to its origin, but the analysis loses none of its edge because it cuts
both ways. Professor Chafee would be the first to concede this perhaps wryly.
The Eastern District of New York ventured a similar analysis
in A.H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Union 50 only to be reversed in the
Second Circuit.51 That court reconciled denial of an injunction
with Lincoln Mills in this fashion. Lincoln Mills refused to
arbitrate; the Bull Steamship Company faced a strike. The circuit
said that the refusal to arbitrate was not conduct protected by
N orris-LaGuardia; a strike was. The flaw in this reasoning is that
Lincoln Mills said the refusal to arbitrate was also a NorrisLaGuardia labor dispute.112 Clearly an employer's refusal to
arbitrate is as much a dispute between employers and employees as
a strike.
Although the Second Circuit recognized that Norris-LaGuardia
openly encouraged arbitration,113 it did not pursue this concept to
its end. For years federal courts and the NLRB have held that a
promise to arbitrate all disputes between an employer and a union
is an implied no-strike clause.54 Suppose a union which signed a
clause like this refused to arbitrate a dispute, but struck instead.
Any district court in the Second Circuit would be compelled by
Lincoln Mills to order the union to arbitrate. Yet that same court,
under Bull, would be powerless to enjoin the strike in direct breach
of a promise it must specifically enforce - an interesting predicament for a court of equity.1111
49 Id. at
50 155 F.

367-68.
Supp. 739 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), rev'd, 250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 932 (1958). "The Norris-LaGuardia Act circumscribed federal jurisdiction••••
The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 conferred such jurisdiction.'' 155 F. Supp.
at 741.
111250 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
52 353 U.S. at 458.
53 47 Stat. 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1958).
114 See notes 106-15 infra, and accompanying text.
55 Cf. Johnson & Johnson v. Textile Workers Union, 184 F. Supp. 359 (D.N.J. 1960).
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The long and the short of it is that the modern labor agreement
needs equal and dispassionate handling by the federal courts. The
courts can hardly weave an ingenious pattern of law from 301 when
it concerns an agreement to arbitrate, yet return to a pristine reading of Norris-LaGuardia when it concerns an agreement not to
strike. If labor unions can enforce in equity but one of the
promises that flow to them from the compulsory bargaining process,
it is exceedingly unfair to deny employers the same treatment for
the only important promise that runs to them from the union.
This is really the reasoning underlying Yellow Transit, and here
it is faultless. It is only what a district court in Washington said
not long ago: "If that [Lincoln Mills] language means what it
plainly says, surely simple justice and common fairness would
dictate that sauce for the goose be such for the gander."56

III.
"[T]he agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid
pro quo for an agreement not to strike,"57 said the Court in Lincoln
Mills. The Court has repeated this equation.58 It is therefore a
part of the federal law of collective labor agreements that binds the
lower federal courts. I mention it again not because I wish to
cavil with such authority, but because I do not understand what
the Court means.
The Court's statement can be taken at least three ways.

I. In every collective bargaining agreement a no-strike clause
is expressly agreed to in exchange for a grievance procedure that
ends in arbitration.
50American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union, 175 F. Supp. 750,
754 (W.D. Wash. 1959). One author said that Lincoln Mills required no such reading,
because substantial damages deterred unions from violating no-strike clauses, while damages for an employer's refusal to arbitrate afford the union only nominal relief. Note,
Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemporary Role of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 99 (1960). This reasoning was based on "a proper adjustment
to the differences in the tactical positions of management and labor when either refuses to
arbitrate." Id. at 99. The author misconceives the tactical positions. Substantial damages
do not deter wildcat strikes; indeed, a union may well risk a damage action tried years
later for the moment's advantage. The author's misconception lies deeper, for he writes
of judicial relief purely from the standpoint of remedy for but one side to a collective
agreement. I doubt if he would agree to the following statement: "Injunctive relief against
a union's refusal to live up to the no-strike clause is necessary because a damage action
for breach of the promise to submit disputes to arbitration would furnish the employer
only nominal relief. But when the employer refuses to arbitrate, the prospect of substantial damages makes the damage award a substantial deterrent." Yet it is the corollary of
what he has said - from another standpoint.
57 353 U.S. at 455.
58 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
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This interpretation assumes that collective bargaining is a neat
and orderly affair. It suggests a quiet room where two negotiators
tick off their proposals one by one, changing, perhaps, the original
proposal after objections or counter-proposals, and upon agreement passing to the next point. Nothing could be further from
the fact. Collective bargaining is a show of economic strength, or
a sideshow, or an arena for bargaining skill of a high order; it is
seldom, if ever, a precise affair with each proposal dovetailed to its
counterpart. Rarely are issues so carefully set out that any observer could with certitude say: "If the employer would agree to
the union's arbitration procedure, the union would agree to the
employer's no-strike clause and the agreement would be closed."
An example will do. Suppose the ABC Company and X Union
have negotiated for a month. They are agreed on wages, hours of
work, insurance and other fringe benefits. Two issues remain. ABC
wants a broad prohibition on strikes, slowdown, picketing or any
other interference with work. In the event of a work stoppage
ABC wants to retain the unlimited right to discipline any or every
striker who violates the agreement - the only arbitrable subject
will be the striker's participation in the wildcat strike. X Union
has no objection to a no-strike clause, and it does not balk over
discharge of strikers taking part in a breach of contract, but it
wants two modifications: ABC must absolve the union of financial
liability for "unauthorized" strikes, and ABC must submit "any
dispute" with the union to arbitration before going to court. This
the employer will not do. Both refuse agreement unless these
proposals are agreed to. Suddenly ABC offers an extra contribution to the cost-of-living allowance conditioned on acceptance of
its no-strike clause alone. X Union drops its arbitration procedure
and signs the agreement. This no-strike clause is the quid pro quo
for the arbitration procedure plus the additional money. There
are many so negotiated.
The point of this recital is simply to indicate the impossibility
of stating that one clause in a labor agreement is the quid pro quo
for any other. This is especially so of the no-strike clause. It is,
after all, the only decisive promise a union makes an employer.
True, a union may recede from a bargaining demand, but this is
hardly a positive undertaking that may be enforced in court.
Therefore, in a very real sense, the promise not to strike is the quid
pro quo for every promise running from the employer to the union,
for it is the only binding commitment the union offers.
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2. Any union which releases its right to strike for a time needs
some way to resolve issues for which it would otherwise strike. The
grievance procedure culminating in arbitration supplies this need.
Even if one is not the express consideration for the other, the law
will construe them as concurrent promises.
This interpretation also dissolves on analysis. A grievance
procedure is supposed to quickly resolve complaints, generally
about the way the company runs the plant. But it is one thing to
say that grievance procedures allow employees to force their employer to honor his agreement. It is quite another to conclude that
these procedures are in their daily operation the automatic equivalent of agreements not to strike. If one states the grievance procedure is the inevitable equal of a no-strike clause, one assumes the
union will strike for each grievable issue. This is ridiculous. Many
grievances are taken to arbitration for reasons that have nothing
to do with their merits. Assume the most obvious example - the
discharge case. Suppose the ABC Company discharges for insubordination an employee ·with seven years' standing. The employee
has been warned before. True, his work record is good, but ABC
thinks it can hire another who will do good work with obedience.
The union leader is caught in a bind. He knows the employee
richly deserved his fate. Many of his members privately agree. But
the employee publicly demands a grievance, and the demand is
hard to refuse. If the steward tells him he deserved the discharge,
he will be called a pa·wn of the employer; if he fails to press the
grievance, he is faithless to his stewardship. It is more expedient
to let the grievant hear the unwelcome news from an arbitrator.
Why not take it to arbitration? Why not, indeed.
The grievance is filed; it is denied at all steps of the grievance
procedure, and it finally goes to arbitration. Whether the arbitrator upholds the discharge or reinstates the employee with or without back pay is neither here nor there. The relevance of this
grievance is that a strike over it would be unpopular if, in fact, the
union could call the strike at all. Airing this grievance may release
tensions, it may be the progressive and enlightened way to do
things, it may be everything arbitrators say it is. One thing it is
not - it is not the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike.
Perhaps the next grievance will be over an issue for which the
union would gladly strike; only then is the employer's agreement
to hear the matter and accept an adverse decision fairly the equivalent of the promise not to strike.
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I realize the agreement to entertain a grievance does not depend
on the merits of the particular controversy. The promise to hear
includes the promise to hear foolishness. But it must be obvious
that the mere presence of an arbitration clause invites its use. A
union hardly surrenders its only economic weapon in return for a
promise to let an arbitrator hear a dispute largely created by his
availability. Unions with experience know their promise not to
strike will bring a higher price. Moreover, this second reading of
the Court's language assumes that grievances cannot be settled
without recourse to arbitration. This, of course, is nonsense.
Grievances are settled every day without recourse to either a grievance procedure or to arbitration. It may be that in the Court's view
arbitration is the best way of settling these matters, but it is by no
means the only way.

3. Arbitration is conducive to settling industrial disputes; so
are pledges not to strike. Both are in the national interest; both
should be encouraged. Since the aim of the no-strike clause and
the arbitration procedure is to prevent work stoppages, one is
naturally the corollary of the other.
This reading has a surface plausibility. It is based upon the
view that the strike is the union's only economic weapon. When
it releases the work stoppage for a time, it needs another method
of making the employer observe the agreement; and arbitration
is the best way of bringing this about. But here the wide variety
of no-strike clauses prevents mechanical application of the Court's
rule.
A recent survey by the Bureau of National Affairs59 shows that
some form of no-strike clauses appear in 94 percent of the labor
agreements reviewed. There are generally two types of clauses:
(1) those unconditionally banning work stoppages for the life of
the agreement; (2) those requiring the union to refrain from
striking only until a condition is fulfilled - such as exhaustion of
a grievance procedure, deadlock during a wage reopening and so
on. The absolute ban on strikes appears in 48 percent of the
agreements reviewed; the conditional bans are provided in 46 percent.
The survey notes that no-strike clauses are generally paralleled
not by arbitration promises, but by pledges from employers regarding lockouts. No-lockout pledges appeared in 84 percent of the
59 47 LAB. REL. REP. 3 (1960).
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contracts reviewed by the survey. Many of these no-strike clauses
conform to the Court's desire for an absolute ban on strikes. But
many are surrounded ·with conditions which must be met before
a court could enforce it.
A no-strike clause, like an arbitration procedure, is an element
of power. It makes the other side honor his agreement. It is valuable only as it is enforceable. If it is hedged with restrictions, it is
more difficult to enforce, and less effective as an enforcing agent.
It may be a model of draftsmanship, but unless it gets results, it is
useless. Parties bargain for weapons, not intellectual equivalents. Consider the agreement where the promise to arbitrate is
exceedingly broad and the no-strike clause is extremely limited.
For example, Article VIII of the Central States Area Over-theRoad Motor Freight agreement60 provides that "there shall be no
strike, lockout, tie-up, or legal proceedings without first using all
possible means of a settlement, as provided for in this Agreement,
of any controversy which might arise." There follows a grievance
procedure with no time limit on its various steps. The second section of this grievance machinery says that "in all cases of an unauthorized strike, slowdown, walkout, or any unauthorized cessation of work in violation of this Agreement, the Union shall not
be liable for damages resulting from such unauthorized acts of its
members." The union in turn promises that it "shall make immediate effort to terminate any strike or stoppage of work which is
not authorized by it without assuming liability therefor." Twentyfour hours after a ·wildcat strike begins the employer has an unfettered right to discharge the employees who participated, and the
employees have no recourse through the grievance machinery.
A moment's reflection shows that this no-strike clause is hardly
the equal of the grievance machinery. "Any controversy" between
the employers and the union may be grieved at any time. The
grievance procedure may be specifically enforced upon showing
that a grievance comes within the arbitration pledge. But should
an employer sue the union for a strike in breach of contract, he
will immediately be confronted with outward evidence that the
union never "authorized" the strike. The employer must prove
that the strike was authorized. A union which has fostered a wildcat strike has ample ways of publicly disassociating itself from the
strike. Astute cross-examination and careful use of the discovery
procedures can sometimes give the lie to writings, telegrams and
601

CCH LAB. L. REP. [UNION CoNTRACTS & ARBJ.TMTION]

,r

59,944 (1960).
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newspaper ads. But these take time - as any union resisting an
equitable order well knows. Of course, the employer has the right
to discharge employees who strike in breach of contract. But this
is negative relief; it is no substitute for judicial action. It is myopic
to say that the no-strike clause above recited is the equivalent of
the grievance machinery.
Consider the reverse. There are grievance procedures that are
narrower than the accompanying no-strike clause. Suppose the
agreement provides that any dispute an employee or his representatives may have with the employer may be grieved, but expressly
exempts arbitration of grievances arising from test work. The
no-strike clause is all-inclusive. If the Court accepts the Tenth
Circuit's view of Norris-LaGuardia and takes its own alignment of
arbitration and no-strike clauses literally, it might refuse to enjoin
a strike over grievances concerning test work. After all, the nostrike clause is broader than the arbitration procedure which is
supposedly its quid pro quo.
What if the no-strike clause is not accompanied by any arbitration provisions? A literalistic reading of the Court's observation
might prevent any equitable enforcement of the no-strike clause.
This reading would rewrite many no-strike and arbitration clauses
at the first available moment. If enforcement means revision of
work stoppage and arbitration clauses to suit the Court's notions
of 301 policy, the parties may have to decide if they are willing to
pay the price. It seems incredible that the Court would thrust its
conception of a desirable labor agreement into a bargaining process
still free. These results are probably what Justices Brennan and
Harlan foresaw in their concurring opinion in the three landmark
arbitration cases:
"The court makes reference to an arbitration clause being
the quid pro quo for a no-strike clause. I do not understand
the court to mean that the application of the principles announced today depends upon the presence of a no-strike clause
in the agreement.'' 61
But perhaps Mr. Justice Douglas' meaning is just what I have
suggested:
"Complete effectuation of the federal policy is achieved
when the agreement contains both an arbitration provision
for all unresolved grievances and an absolute prohibition of
61 363

U.S. at 573.
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strikes, the arbitration agreement being the 'quid pro quo' for
the agreement not to strike.'' 62
The short answer to all this is that 301 gives jurisdiction to
entertain "suits for violation of contracts." Congress did not withdraw from the judicial power agreements which the Supreme
Court finds distasteful. Congress sets American labor policy, as we
have been reminded for many years by the Court and the academicians. Congress called for equal enforcement of voluntary agreements. And courts which refuse to enforce those agreements they
do not feel accomplish a "complete effectuation of the federal
policy" would bring labor policy full circle with a vengeance. They
would thus form a labor policy through their equity powers, quite
as much as in the bad old days before Norris-LaGuardia.

IV.
Even if the agreement to arbitrate is not always the agreed-upon
exchange for the agreement not to strike, the two are intimately
connected in another fashion.

A.
Often a union sued for damages for breach of a no-strike clause
requests the court to stay6 3 or dismiss64 the damage action so it may
arbitrate the issues giving rise to the strike, 611 or of the strike itself. 66
The reason is no mystery. An arbitrator may be far more
tolerant of strikes in breach of contract than a court, bound as a
court is to common law rules of contractual integrity. Courts
enforce agreements as they are ·written; they cannot map out the
societal good as freely as many who answer the arbitrator's calling.
Consider a discharge for leadership of a strike in breach of contract.
A court, like the NLRB, will consider participation of a union
officer determinative; 67 an arbitrator's standards are not so strict.
Some arbitrators say a union leader owes responsibility above and
62 Id. at 578 n.4. See also Note, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1205 (1958).
68 E.g., Tenney Eng'r, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 174 F. Supp.

878 (D.N.J. 1959).
Brady Transfer&: Storage Co. v. Local 710, Meat Drivers, 22 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r 67,121
(N.D. III. 1952) (alternative motions to dismiss or stay).
65 Armsttong-Nonvalk Rubber Corp. v. Local 283, United Rubber Workers, 167 F.
Supp. 817 (D. Conn. 1958), appeal dismissed, 269 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1959) (motion to stay
pending arbitration of discharge giving rise to strike, and/or of tbe strike itself).
66 Gay's Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 169 F. Supp. 834 (D. Mass.
1959).
67 See United Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 981 (1956); American Gilsonite Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1514 (1958), affd on reconsideration,
122 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1959).
M
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beyond the normal to control the work stoppage. This school reasons that if leaders order their members to return to work, themselves setting the example, these stoppages would greatly decrease. 68
Others find this treatment discriminatory.69 They state that a
union leader is one employee of many who must be punished as
every other. Arbitrators also use a less rigid standard in appraising
union responsibility for the strike.70 They are far more niggardly
in their calculation of damages.71
In short, the union, like any litigant, seeks the most hospitable
forum. Employers, too, move for a stay of a damage action pending
arbitration when it suits their purpose.72
68 Note, Considerations in Disciplining Employees for Participation in Violations of
the No-Strike Clause, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 999, 1017-20 (1958).
69Ibid.
70 See the discussion in Note, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 908, 913 (1958).
71 Ibid. See also Regent Quality Furniture, Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 553 (Arbitrator Turkus).
72 Metal Polishers Union v. Rubin, 85 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1949). Prior to General
Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, 353 U.S. 547 (1957), a disagreement had arisen
in the circuits as to the application of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. ~§ 2-14
(1958), to collective bargaining agreements. Holding that the act applies: International
Union, UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d 536 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 814 (1957); Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. General
Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), afj'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 547 (1957); Tenney
Eng'r, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953) (with the proviso that
the exclusion applied to collective bargaining agreements covering transportation workers).
Holding that the act does not apply: United Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co.,
241 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 354 U.S. 906 (1957); Lincoln Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 448
(1957); United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954);
Commercial Packing Co. v. Butchers Union, 35 L.R.R.M. 2142 (S.D. Cal. 1954). The disagreement in the circuit courts stemmed largely from applications by unions to stay
damage actions for breach of no-strike clauses pending arbitration. Unions sought a stay
of these damage actions under § 3 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1958), which allows
a court to "stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement. . . ." Of course, a condition to any such stay was that
the issue sought to be arbitrated was referable to arbitration. The circuits split on the
qualifying phrase of § 1 of the act, 9 U.S.C. § l (1958), which states that the act shall not
"apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." This disagreement will probably be
resolved at some time by the Supreme Court, although it is probably academic in view
of General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, supra. There the First Circuit, 233
F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), had held that the Arbitration Act provided the substance for § 301,
which the First Circuit regarded as exclusively procedural. Harmonizing these two statutes,
the First Circuit had ordered arbitration. The Supreme Court followed a rather elliptical
path. It sustained the First Circuit, but declined to rule on the Arbitration Act. "We follow
in part a different path than the Court of Appeals though we reach the same result." 353
U.S. at 548. If the issue is squarely presented again to the Court, the Arbitration Act will
find a powerful opponent in Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who set forth in his dissenting
opinion in Lincoln Mills the reasons for the act's inapplicability to collective bargaining
agreements. "When Congress passed legislation to enable arbitration agreements to be
enforced by the federal courts, it saw fit to exclude this remedy with respect to labor
contracts." 353 U.S. at 466.
Whether or not the Arbitration Act does apply to labor agreements really makes little
difference now, since under Lincoln Mills the federal courts are empowered to fashion
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B.
Unions have always been eager to remove breach of a no-strike
clause from the courts to arbitration. Three decisions in the last
term of the Supreme Court will encourage their endeavor. A consideration of one will do. In United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Nav. Co.,73 the union tried for nineteen years to restrict by
contract the employer's right to subcontract work. It failed. One
day, as in the past, the employer did subcontract some work heretofore done by bargaining unit employees. The union filed a
grievance under a clause that forbade any work stoppage to settle
disputes, but rather compelled use of the grievance machinery to
review "differences ... between the Company and the Union or its
members . . . as to the meaning and application of this Agreement. . . ." 74 The agreement also said that "matters which are
strictly a function of management shall not be subject to arbitration under this section." 75 The union filed a grievance to protest
this practice of subcontracting; the employer refused to entertain
it, and the lower courts held he had a perfect right to. The Supreme Court reversed.
The grievance procedure did not expressly exclude from its
scope the employer's contracting out of work. The employer's
practice involved a "difference"; it was certainly a "local trouble
of any kind" which might be grieved. Any judicial attempt to
examine the bargaining history of the parties "necessarily comprehends the merits," and the meri~ were the arbitrator's preserve
upon which judges might not poach. Under a grievance procedure
comprehending broad submissions, only express reservations will
keep certain issues from its ambit.
But the startling effect of Warrior is the possible result of the
arbitration it orders. For nineteen years the Steelworkers Union
has tried to restrict by contract Warrior's practice of subcontracting work to outside firms. 76 It has failed. Now the validity of this
practice will be decided by an arbitrator, himself a creature of
contract. The power to decide includes the power to decide both
federal substantive law of collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, federal courts may
stay actions under § 301, just as if the Arbitration Act applied.
73 363
74 363

U.S. 574 (1960), 59 MICH. L. REv. 454 (1961).
U.S. at 576.
75lbid.
76 The lower court considered this of deciding importance. See the decision by Judge
Tuttle, United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 269 F.2d 633, 636-37 (5th Cir.
1959), affirming 168 F. Supp. 702 (1958).
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ways, and these powers the Warrior arbitrator will have in full
measure. He may deny the grievance; he may grant it. If he grants
it, the full scope of Warrior will be there for all to see. For then
the union will be awarded a concession by arbitration that it could
not achieve in nineteen years of negotiation. The award will bind
the parties until it is explicitly overturned in a future agreement.
In practical effect, therefore, it amends the agreement.77 By arbitration one party will have been able materially to modify his
undertaking with the other, and he will have done it through a
scheme designed to apply the agreement as written. To those who
still view arbitration as consensual, this is a jarring result indeed.
As startling as the actual result is the Court's view of the
arbitral process. I had always supposed that arbitration was a
relatively inexpensive way for two who disagree to compose their
differences. The man chosen to do this is confined to the agreement
which creates his power. His power is considerable. He binds the
parties with his decision unless he steps completely beyond the
agreement, or takes a bribe.78 Of course, there are all manner of
arbitrators. Some are intelligent, some are not. Some confine
themselves to a careful reading of the agreement which authorizes
their presence; others summon a higher wisdom to which they
alone are privy. Some are impartial; others are biased; and yet
others give truth to the commonly held notion that arbitrators
split their justice so they will be asked back again.
Over the years an idea that arbitration is a science approaching
the oracular has gained wide currency. This image of arbitration
sees men of learning available to few doling out a justice of awesome quality. The image is the creation of men who arbitrate for
a fee. Of course, it is not strange for a profession to cloak its practice in mystery so that the herd should approach with reverence.
Medicine and the law have done this for generations. The practice
is humbug nonetheless. There are few arbitration cases that could
not be wisely decided by an intelligent observer who reads the
agreement with care and listens with attention to the arguments
77 Most arbitration clauses prohibit the arbitrator from amending or in any way modifying the agreement. One district court, Local 725, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v.
Standard Oil Co., 186 F. Supp. 895 (D.N.D. 1960), read this clause as expressly prohibiting
the arbitrator from deciding issues completely rejected in negotiations.
78 See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (Supp. Page 1960) and § 2711.10 (Page
1953), which allow vacation of an arbitration award if it was procured by corruption, or
evident partiality, or misconduct of the hearing, or if the arbitrator exceeded the powers
granted him.
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presented to him. Who has not heard arbitrators fulminate at tiresome length over an issue any sensible person - including a federal
judge - could dispatch in short order with a little horse sense? Naturally some issues - incentive plans, time-studies, guaranteed annual wage supplements - are technically more demanding than
others, but the knowledge to decide can be acquired. It is the job
of any litigant to inform the judge. Nevertheless, the view that
labor arbitrators are mystagogues is held by many, and among these
are at least six Justices of the Supreme Court.
In the view of the Warrior Court, the arbitrator in his wisdom
"is not confined to the express provisions of the contract." 79 Far
from it. He is to look to "the practices of the industry and the
shop"80 which are "equally a part of the ... agreement although
not expressed in it." 81 After all, is he not selected because the
union and management repose "confidence in his knowledge of the
common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judgment
to bring to bear considerations which are not expressed in the contract ..."?8 2 And in exercising his personal judgment he must
consider all manner of things which will be good for the parties "the productivity of a particular result, its consequence to the
morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will be heightened or diminished."83 Small wonder that one observer, himself
an arbitrator, finds Mr. Justice Douglas' picture of the arbitration
process "more like the praise . . . one might hear . . . at a public
function of an arbitration group" than the "hard, practical day to
day process of hearing and determining grievances."84
For better or for worse, Warrior and its companions give the
broadest possible sweep to arbitration. These principles emerge:
1. The court determines arbitrability. "[A]rbitration is a
matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."85
2. The court, in making its determination, must read
the contract from its four corners. "It is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a
711 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
80 Id. at 582.

811bid.
82Ibid.
88Ibid.
84 Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law, October Term, 1959, 60
901, 9!10 (1960).
85 363 U.S. at 582.
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claim which on its face is governed by the agreement."86 It
may not review bargaining history.87
3. All doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitrability.88
4. A party asserting non-arbitrability must prove it. He
does so through:
(a) an express exclusion of the issue from the grievance
or arbitration procedures;
(b) a written collateral agreement excluding the issue
from arbitration; or
(c) "most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the
claim from arbitration ...." 89 The evidence showing an issue
is not arbitrable must be very forceful indeed; Warrior's evidence of nineteen years of demand, refusal and practice was
not enough.
Under the impetus of Warrior, an arbitrator asked to determine
union responsibility for a strike in breach of contract has a wide
palette of remedies. He may reason that since the union's treasury
is low, the "morale of the shop" would be disastrously affected by
an award of money damages to the employer. And of course no
modern, enlightened employer would decrease morale. He may
conclude that the discharge of the stewards who led the strike will
heighten tensions - as discharges always do for a time. Therefore,
the discharges should be commuted to a layoff. Or if the offending
stewards are skilled workers, the arbitrator may reason it will take
weeks to train their replacements. "Productivity" will decrease;
this is undesirable, a lesser penalty is called for. Or suppose in this
industry the employer is alone in its policy of discharge and court
action to redress a breach of contract. Its policies are not "the
practices of the industry." The arbitrator certainly cannot allow
one employer to upset a usage others have created over the years.
All this may seem far-fetched, but it is not impossible. One
arbitrator has already reasoned that an employer should not be
awarded damages for strikes in breach of a no-strike clause in order
86 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960). (Emphasis
added.)
87 Ibid. This is indeed a radical departure from the customary principles of contractual construction. Mr. Justice Brennan may have some qualms about this wholesale approach. See his concurring opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, in the three landmark
cases. Id. at 569.
88 Id. at 568. Where, however, it is clear that the agreement expressly excludes certain
issues from arbitration, a district court will not order arbitration, Warrior notwithstanding.
International Molders' Union v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., Civil No.
3948, W.D. Ky., Feb. 9, 1961.
89 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 585 (1960).

1961]

Na-STRIKE CLAUSES

697

"to avoid the regeneration of antagonisms that finally have been
dissipated... .'' 90 In place of damages he ordered "full co-operation
11/ith management in making up the production losses...." 91 Arbitrators so inclined must read Warrior with relish.
Warrior's effect on bargaining for the next few years is not hard
to predict. Unions will try to write into labor agreements the
widest possible arbitration clauses which, above all, give to the
employer an express right to file grievances against the union. Employers will try to constrict the scope of arbitration to exclude
specifically the issues they do not wish reviewed. Unions will strike
for arbitration clauses which cover the range of their relations
with capital; employers will do their best to frustrate these strikes.
In the struggle created by the Court's opinions, unions will exert
great energy to subject breach of a no-strike clause to the arbitral
process. Nowhere 11/ill they encounter more resistance.

C.
Federal courts have been decidedly cool to suggestions that they
relinquish to arbitrators the power to judge breach of a no-strike
clause. Unions will no doubt argue that Warrior has made this
attitude obsolete. If the Supreme Court holds that a no-strike
clause may be specifically enforced in the federal courts, this attitude will take on added importance.
All federal cases granting or denying stay of court action require
construction of the contract under which arbitration is requested.
But the differing results in the circuits cannot be dismissed as mere
disagreements on the meaning of language; courts have arrived at
opposite results when presented 11/ith virtually identical wording.
For the reader's ease I have arranged the cases according to their
theories.
I. A strike in breach of contract is not a"grievance" as that word

is commonly used. This view was most positively articulated by
the Sixth Circuit.92 That court has since reiterated this view.93
The Fourth Circuit94 and probably the Fifth agree. 95 These courts
M. Singer &: Sons, 13 Lab. Arb. 533, 536 (Arbitrator Scheiber).
911bid.
92 Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, 217 F.2d 49, 53 (6th Cir. 1954).
93International Union, UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d 536, 541
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957).
94 International Union, United Furniture "\Vorkers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring
Co., 168 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1948); United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc.,
215 F. 2d 221, 223 (4th Cir. 1954).
05 Lodge 12, IAM v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467, 471 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
90
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have applied this reasoning to clauses employing wide terms in
describing possible submissions.96
These courts reason that "grievance" or a synonym refers to the
daily disagreements that naturally arise where employees are governed by written contract. Every "grievance" alleges a breach of
contract. The employer did or did not violate the agreement by
his computation of overtime, or schedule of vacations, or subcontracting of work. The critical difference between these "breaches"
and strikes in violation of the agreement is that these "breaches"
are contemplated. The grievance procedure is there to let employees and the union prove them. A strike in violation of contract,
however, ruptures the entire agreement - especially that part of it
designed to settle "breaches" peacefully.
The Second97 Circuit at one time disagreed; the Third98 still
does. These decisions are not based upon an analysis of "grievance"
and what it means, but rather upon a generous endorsement of arbitration; the arbitrator, and not the court, determines what "grievance" means.

2. A strike in breach of contract is a repudiation of an agreement to arbitrate. The Fourth,99 Six.th,1°° First101 and Seventh102
96 Benton Harbor: "shall difference arise . • • as to the meaning and application of
this Agreement, or should any local trouble arise.••." 242 F.2d at 538.
Miller Metal Products: "all differences, disputes and grievances that may arise between
the parties to this contract with respect to the matters covered in this agreement. • • ."
215 F.2d at 223.
97 Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957). It is impossible to reconcile the theories of Signal-Stat
and Markel Elec. Prods., Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1953). Signal•
Stat is based on a broad philosophical encouragement of arbitration; it was decided by
Judges Clark, Frank, and Hincks. Markel, in which Judge Clark dissented, is based on a
close reading of the agreement; it was decided by Judges Swan and Chase. The scope of
arbitration agreement was equally broad in both. The Circuit has recently returned to
the Markel reasoning in Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Union, 47
L.R.R.M. 2612 (2d Cir., Feb. 17, 1961) CTudges Lumbard, Swan, Moore).
98 Tenney Eng'r, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953), on remand,
174 F. Supp. 878 (D.N.J. 1959).
99 See the cases cited in note 94 supra. The scholarly and precise analysis of Judge
Parker in Colonial Hardwood merits careful study by all interested in this area.
100 See notes 93 and 96 supra.
101 W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 129 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass.
1955), afj'd, 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 352 U.S.
802 (1956). For companion litigation, see W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954), denying a temporary injunction for breach of the
same no-strike clause giving rise to the damage action.
The arbitration and grievance procedures in cases applying the principle that a strike
in breach of contract is a repudiation of an agreement to arbitrate are quite broad. The
Benton Harbor and Miller Metal Products clauses are quoted in note 96 supra; the Mead
clause is even broader: "should any dispute, grievance or complaint arise during the life
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Circuits are fond of this theory. It is based upon considerations
of fairness. Arbitration provides the union a swift way to remedy
"breaches" of the agreement by the employer. A strike in breach
of contract is diametrically opposed to settlement of the dispute by
arbitration. The union has the right peacefully to challenge the
employer's decision within the plant; it should not simultaneously
bring additional pressure from without. The union has elected to
strike, not arbitrate. It does not get two bites at the apple. The
point is articulated by the Seventh Circuit:
"The Unions chose to act suddenly and without warning
in using the economic force or pressure of a sit do,vn strike.
Obviously, a chief purpose of the arbitration agreement was
to avoid a strike. When the Unions embarked upon the strike
they voluntarily by-passed arbitration. When they struck the
wrong was done and the damage to plaintiff [employer] began.
Then it was that plaintiff's right of action for damages and
injunctive relief to prevent further damage accrued."103
I think the Supreme Court will agree. In Warrior the Court said
grievance arbitration is "the substitute for industrial strife."104
And it is possible the Supreme Court has already accepted this view
this term. Prior to Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp.105 the circuits
split over the meaning of a labor agreement with an extremely
broad arbitration clause but with no prohibition on strikes. The
First,106 Fourth107 and Sixth108 Circuits reasoned that a promise
by the union to submit all conflicts with the employer to arbitration was an implied no-strike clause. The NLRB agreed.109 When
the union struck over an issue it did not submit to arbitration it
violated the implied no-strike clause. The employer could then
of this agreement •.• the dispute, grievance or complaint shall be referred to the arbitration panel. •••" 217 F.2d at 7. See also W. L. Mead, Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1955), where
the NLRB agreed with the First Circuit's construction of this clause.
102 Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union, 235 F.2d 108, 111 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 912 (1956). There is strong indication in this decision that the unions
forfeited their right to arbitrate the issue giving rise to the strike because they chose the
strike to resolve it. 235 F.2d at 112.
103 Cuneo Press, Inc. v. Kokomo Paper Handlers' Union,
104 363 U.S. at 578. (Emphasis added.)
lOu 361 U.S. 459 (1960).
100 W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,

supra note 102, at 111.

129 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass.
1955), afj'd 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed per stipulation, 352 U.S.
802 (1956).
107 United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 847 (1955).
108 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1958), afj'd on this point by
an equally divided Court, 361 U.S. 459 (1960).
100 W. L. Mead, Inc., 113 NL.R.B. 1040 (1955).
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sue for damages in the courts; he committed no unfair labor practice in firing the strikers. The rationale of these courts was that
"the purpose of the strike was to effect a determination of the question without an adjudication. The strike, in other words, was
intended to be a substitute £or the arbitration procedure."110 The
Board's reasoning was similar.111 However, the District of Columbia Circuit which in a different context had refused to hold such
an arbitration clause to be an implied no-strike pledge112 has since
Benedict Coal reaffirmed this earlier stand.11 3
The arbitration clause in Benedict Coal could hardly be broader. It expressly contemplated submission of a work stoppage to
arbitration. "[A]ny and all disputes, stoppages, suspension of work,
and all claims, demands or actions growing therefrom . . .
shall be . . . settled" by the grievance machinery.114 The Sixth
Circuit read this clause as an implied no-strike clause in an opinion
by Judge, now Justice, Potter Stewart. The Supreme Court affirmed
by an equally-divided Court, Mr. Justice Stewart abstaining.
Though an affirmance by an equally-divided Court imparts no
opinion on the merits,1115 the reason for the equal division of the
Court will undoubtedly carry weight in the minds of practitioners
and perhaps the lower federal courts.
The Benedict Coal reasoning makes sense. It does no violence
to Warrior and its companion cases. Broad as the Warrior principles are, they relate to internal disagreements between the parties.
They do not go to a breach of the agreement that suspends the
whole undertaking.
3. A strike in breach of contract is not arbitrable unless the
grievance procedure gives the employer a right to file a grievance
with the union and process it to arbitration. This reasoning is
expressly endorsed by the Sixth116 and Second117 Circuits, and
various district courts.11 8 It is based on a close analysis of the terms
and philosophy of a grievance procedure.
110w. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 126 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D.
Mass. 1954). (Emphasis added.)
111 W. L. Mead, Inc., ll3 NL.R.B. 1040, 1043 (1955).
112 International Union, UMW v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 2ll (D.C. Cir. 1958).
113 Miles Branch Coal Co. v. UMW, 47 L.R.R.M. 2423 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1961).
114 259 F.2d at 350.
1115 Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960), 59 MICH. L. REv. 447 (1961).
116International Union, UAW v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d 536, 541
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957).
117 Markel Elec. Prods., Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d 435, 437 (2d Cir. 1953).
But see the discussion in note 97 supra.
118 Square D Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776, 782-83 (E.D. Mich. 1954);
Bassick Co. v. Bassick Local 229, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 126 F. Supp. 777 (D. Conn.
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Arbitration is generally the last step in a grievance procedure.
Few are the cases which go directly to arbitration. The reasons are
excellent. Many grievances are dropped after they are aired in the
conferences and meetings required before arbitration. The
heinous injury is not quite so bad after a few days; one side has
misread the agreement; the union and the employer swap this
grievance for that. The various steps afford "opportunity to subordinate authorities to participate and effect adjustments within
their special competence and concern."119 Moreover, arbitration
can be expensive. Both parties want to know the strength of their
positions before taking them to the umpire. The best way to test
them is at the grievance meetings. For these reasons and others
like them, courts and arbitrators are loathe to permit arbitration
where the grievance procedures have not been exhausted.120 They
lead to the sensible conclusion that arbitration is no broader than
the process which precedes it unless the parties give it original
jurisdiction.
Application of this reasoning shows the folly of processing
breach of a no-strike clause through the normal route of grievances.
Most grievance procedures begin when an employee presents his
complaint to his immediate foreman. It would be rather peculiar
for an employer to ask lower supervision to calculate damages
sustained in a strike. For example, in Square D Co. v. United
Elec. Workers,121 the union requested a stay of a damage action
pending arbitration. It claimed the breach was arbitrable under
a clause calling for arbitration of "all disputes." However, arbitration was the last step in a grievance procedure, and "the entire
procedure is geared to adjust grievances of employees and ... it is
completely silent as to any possible grievances by the employer.
If the last paragraph, on which defendants so strongly rely, includes
within its ambit claims by the employer for breach of contract, how
would it proceed? It is not an employee and it would be absurd
to suggest that it should initiate a grievance or complaint with the
sh op foreman .... "122
This reasoning seems likely to survive Warrior. Warrior states
that a party who asserts non-arbitrability must prove it, and he can
1954); Borg-Warner v. United Farm Equip. Workers, 22 Lab. Arb. 443 (N.D. Ill. 1954);
Harris Hub Bed &: Spring Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 121 F. Supp. 40, 43 (M.D. Pa. 1954).
119 SHULMAN &: CHAMBERLAIN, CAsES ON LABoR RELATIONS 6 (1949).
120 58 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 908, 912 (1958).
121 123 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
122 Id. at 783. Accord, :Markel Elec. Prods., Inc. v. United Elec. Workers,

437 (2d Cir. 1953).

202 F.2d 435,
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do so by showing an express exclusion of the issue from the
grievance machinery. It would be difficult to imagine a more
express exclusion than failure to allow a claimant a method to
present his claim. After all, the agreement could easily be written
to make the grievance machinery run both ways. Moreover, this
is perfectly consonant with Warrior's command to the lower courts
to read only the agreement. Whether the employer can file a
grievance against the union is perfectly plain from the face of the
contract.
The result is also supported by common sense. Most employers
do not bargain for a right to file grievances for a good and simple
reason: they don't need to.123 Unless the employer is limited by
contract, he runs his plant as he pleases. Certainly the Warrior
Court recognized this. "[A]bsent a collective bargaining agreement ... [management functions] may be exercised freely except
as limited by public law and by the willingness of employees to
work under the particular, unilaterally imposed conditions."124
If the union thinks the employer has misapplied the agreement,
the grievance procedure is there to bring the employer to terms.
A grievance procedure is written into an agreement for the union's
use. Of course, agreements can provide a grievance procedure for
the employer, and some do.125 But it would be foolish to presume
its presence.
The effect of such a presumption is perfectly exemplified by
Tenney Eng'r, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers. 126 The Tenney
Company had agreed to an extremely broad grievance procedure.
It called for arbitration of "all differences, disputes and grievances"
which were not settled under the procedure set forth in the agreement.127 The grievance was first referred to the department
steward and the foreman, then to the shop committee and plant
superintendent, and then to an international representative of the
union and a designated officer of the employer. The union struck
in breach of its no-strike clause and the employer sued for damages.
The union moved for a stay of the action pending arbitration. Its
request was granted. The court conceded that the first two steps
of the grievance procedure were hardly appropriate to determine
123 GREGORY, LABoR AND THE LAw 494-95 (2d rev. ed. 1958).
124 363 U.S. at 583.
125 See article VII of the agreement between the Brooklyn Union Gas Co. and Local
101, Transp. Workers Union, 1 CCH LAB. L. REP. [UNION CoNTRACTS &: ARBITRATION]
11 59,911 (1960).
126 174 F. Supp. 878 (D.N.J. 1959).
121 Id. at 879.
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the issue of a wildcat strike. The court felt, however, that in the
third step of the grievance procedure the union representative and
one from the employer could initiate the issue of responsibility and
damages. And arbitration was desirable as a general matter.
I believe the case was incorrectly decided. The result distorts
a grievance procedure which left nothing to the imagination. The
grievance procedure did not waive the first two steps if the nostrike clause was breached. It was mandatory that any grievance
start at the beginning, no matter how serious. The incongruity
of Tenney and like cases128 is thrown into high relief if the Supreme
Court finds that 301 allows equitable relief for breach of a no-strike
clause. Then under the Tenney rule the employer, before asking
the federal court for a restraining order, would have to seek out
the union's international representative to present his claim that
the union was responsible for the breach of the agreement. The
international representative might deny all responsibility for the
strike; he might indicate the strike would cease the moment the
employer capitulated on the issue giving rise to the strike. He
might not be available until next week. The dispute would
probably go to arbitration. If the parties could agree on an arbitrator, a hearing might be set within seventy-two hours.
To state the Tenney results is to answer them. They are
ludicrous. And especially so because parties can expressly agree
to waive the grievance procedure in dealing with a strike in breach
of contract. They can, and they have. In Ruppert v. Egelhofer129
the parties agreed that any breach of the broad no-strike clause
would waive the grievance procedure. Arbitration could be had,
and an award rendered, forty-eight hours after notification. The
employer claimed a slowdown in breach of the agreement, the
arbitrator "enjoined" the unions from this conduct, and the New
York courts upheld the award.
The solution is novel, but as a remedy for irreparable injury
it has one special drawback. The arbitrator's award is not selfenforcing. The Ruppert award had to go to court. I believe
128 Lewittes &: Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
Annstrong-Nonvalk Rubber Corp. v. Local 283, United Rubber Workers, 167 F. Supp. 817
(D. Conn. 1958), appeal dismissed, 269 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1959); Brady Transfer &: Storage
Co. v. Local 710, Meat Drivers &: Helpers, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 22 CCH Lab. Cas.
11 67,121 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
The court's attempt to distinguish a contrary case in its own district, Structural Steel
&: Ornamental Iron Ass'n v. Local 545, Int'l Ass'n of Bridgeworkers, 172 F. Supp. 354
(D.N.J. 1959), is extremely unconvincing. And see Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 47 L.R.R.l\f. 2612, 2615 n.8 (2d Cir., Feb. 17, 1961).
120 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129 (1958), 58 CoLUI\I. L. REv. 908 (1958).
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similar awards would follow the same route. The arbitrator has
no powers of contempt; a finding that his award has been violated
may be forced to a court decree. And all of this takes time. Moreover, a hearing before the arbitrator would probably be on the
merits. Temporary restraining orders, or preliminary injunctions,
are designed to end speedily irreparable injury without an extended hearing. Under federal practice the hearing on the merits
is set down shortly after the order is signed, so that if it was wrongly
issued, it will be quickly dissolved.
The essential ineffectiveness of an arbitrator's injunction of a
strike in breach of contract leads to the most important disadvantage of subjecting this breach to the arbitral process. I repeat that
the no-strike clause is the only provision in a labor agreement of
direct benefit to the employer. No employer who thinks of the
matter abandons by inference his right to enforce this clause in the
most effective forum - the courts. The law should be reluctant
to presume relinquishment of so important a right.

V.
It must be obvious that traditional contract doctrine has run
a zigzag course in its application to collective labor agreements. It
is a favored theory that these agreements are so unique that none
but the initiate may understand them. They are said to be so
peculiar in their structure and so singular in their application that
none but the expert may interpret them. Collective bargaining
agreements are odd ducks. Whether they are a third-party
beneficiary contract, a trade agreement, or a fiduciary relationship,130 they bear marked differences to familiar contracts. They
are designed to cover many people. They are generally of short
duration.131 The bargaining leading to their execution is compelled by law. 132 Sometimes their execution is attended by strikes,
boycotts, or the good offices of politicians attending the public
weal. They are just different enough from ordinary undertakings
that some listen to the votary who says this undertaking is beyond
judicial competence.
Naturally, this reading is gratifying to the proclaimed expert.
It gives him a license to develop the law as he goes along. Depar130 See generally GREGORY, op. cit. supra note 123, at 445-52; Cox, Rights Under a
Labor Agreement, 69 HAR.v. L. REv. 601 (1956).
131 The NLRB encourages this by holding that a collective bargaining agreement is
not a bar to a petition for an election by a rival union for more than two years. Pacific
Coast Ass'n of Pulp & Paper Mfrs., 121 NL.R.B. 990 (1958).
132 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a) (5), (b) (3) (1958).
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ture from traditional concepts is easy to explain - the expert is
dealing with "industrial reality."
A great deal of this talk. is nonsense. Collective bargaining
agreements are negotiated to bind an employer and a union. The
law contemplates an agreement which holds both parties to their
bargain. Section 8 (d) of the act speaks of "the negotiation of an
agreement ... and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached.... " 133 The arrangement which binds
the parties is the same one jurisprudence has found effective for
some years -a written contract. And in section 301, Congress
allowed federal courts to hear suits for violation of contracts, not
suits for violation of unique legal hybrids.
It would be tempting to analyze the concepts of offer, acceptance, and consideration in light of NLRB rules of the bargaining
practice, but this is beside the point in an article on the no-strike
clause. "A total breach of contract is a breach whose remedial
rights provided by law are substituted for all the existing contractual rights, or can be so substituted by the injured party."134
Clearly breach of a no-strike clause is a material breach of contract.
It is certainly so in light of the quotation which opened this article
and the bargaining concepts which I have already discussed.
Because it is a material breach, a strike in violation of a nostrike pledge immediately gives rise to several rights of action by
the employer.

I. The employer may treat the strike as a total breach and
rescind the agreement. In United Elec. Workers v. NLRB 135 the
union struck in breach of contract. The employer told all employees by letter that they had been removed from the payroll;
that all who had taken part in the strike were discharged; that the
contract was cancelled; and that the company would no longer
bargain ·with the union. The Board found that these acts did not
violate the act,1 36 and the District of Columbia Circuit upheld this
finding. It bottomed its reasoning on general principles of contract law, citing so conventional a source as the Restatement of
Contracts for the proposition that one party to an agreement need
not perform if the other party refuses in a material respect to do so.
"Moreover, in cases where the breach is a strike in violation of a collective bargaining agreement, as in the instant
133 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1958).
184 REsiATEMENT, CoNTRACI'S § 313 (I) (1932).
135 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981
136 Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B. 1171 (1953).

(1956).

706

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

case, application of the rule is supported by the rationale
underlying such agreements .... A no-strike provision is 'The
chief advantage which an employer can reasonably expect
from a collective labor agreement.' The walkout was a material breach which justified the subsequent rescission of the
contract by the Company."137
The court imposed an affirmative obligation on the participants
of the strike to disavow their activity. All employees had received
the employer's letter informing them of their discharge for breach
of contract. All remained silent. By taking no steps to disavow the
action of their agent, the union, the Board was justified in concluding that the employees had acquiesced in the union's action.
They therefore shared with the union its penalty.
If the employer elects to rescind he cannot subsequently sue
the union for damages. He has elected his remedy. 138 Of course,
the NLRB does not enjoin these strikes or award damages for them
because a breach of contract, by clear congressional direction, is
left to the courts. The Board redresses these breaches within its
own bailiwick. It rules that the employer may discharge any or
all employees who strike in breach of contract; 139 the Board does
not weigh relative guilt. Since the employer may discharge all
employees who strike in breach of contract, he may pick and choose
which of the strikers he will rehire.140 The Board also reasons that
union leaders bear a greater responsibility to remedy breach of a
no-strike clause; their discharge for failure to do so is not discriminatory.141 Moreover, the Board suspends compulsory bargaining
during a strike in breach of contract.142
137 223 F.2d at 341.
138 Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge, IAM, 91 F. Supp. 596
(W.D. Wash. 1950), afj'd, 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1951).
139 American Gilsonite Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1514 (1958), aff'd on reconsideration, 122
N.L.R.B. 1006 (1959); United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949).
140 Michigan Lumber Fabricators, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 579 (1955); see also the following
administrative rulings of NLRB General Counsel: Case No. K-719, 39 L.R.R.l\f. 1024 (1956);
Case No. F-854, 44 L.R.R.M. 1112 (1959); Case No. F-1095, 44 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1959).
141 Stockham Pipe Fittings Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 629 (1949); see also the following administrative rulings of NLRB General Counsel: Case No. F-854, 44 L.R.R.M. 1112 (1959);
Case No. F-253, 41 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1958).
142Valley City Furniture Co., 110 NL.R.B. 1589 (1954), enforced, 230 F.2d 947 (6th
Cir. 1956).
It will be noted that the cases cited in notes 139-42 span two political administrations.
Whatever the effects of a national election on the NLRB, it seems safe to predict consistent
treatment of the no-strike clause.
I repeat that the text oversimplifies. Section 8 (d) of the act, 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (d) (1958), writes into every agreement at least a sixty-day no-strike clause. See Note,
69 YALE L.J. 309 (1959). The most obvious problem will arise when a strike breaches a
no-strike clause and § 8 (d) as well, and the Board chooses to exercise its discretionary
powers to ask for an injunction under § 10 (j) of the act, 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
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2. The employer may treat the strike as a partial breach, subject to an injunction or damages or both. He may ask the state
courts to enjoin the strike or award damages under section 301 or
state common law.143 It is the thesis of this article that he should
be able to follow a similar course in the federal courts under 30 I.
There is nothing strange in these principles. Their result is
just. Judges should demand more than the predilections of an
expert as reason for scrapping them. Indeed, departure from these
principles produces bizarre results. Consider Mastro Plastics Corp.
v. NLRB. 144 That case is said to mean that a union is privileged
to strike in violation of a no-strike clause when the strike is in
protest of an employer's unfair labor practices. The Mastro Plastics
unfair labor practices were many and serious. The employer, favoring one union over another, gave every form of assistance to the
favored union, including the discharge of some seventy-seven employees who refused to join the union the employer preferred.
The Board,14 5 the Second Circuit,146 and the Supreme Court147
held that a strike over these unfair labor practices was protected
activity, in spite of the presence of the no-strike clause. They
ordered reinstatement of strikers discharged for violation of contract. Professor Cox has aptly remarked that traditional contract
principles would have produced the same result without the tortured reasoning employed by all three forums.148 The law implies
in every agreement a covenant of good faith that neither party will
attempt to destroy the existence of the other, thereby preventing
fulfillment of the agreement. When Mastro Plastics attempted to
destroy the identity of the union with which it had an agreement
by discharging seventy-seven of its members, it violated the prom§ 160 G) (1958). The short answer to this is probably that the NLRB is not the only forum
capable of effectuating a national labor policy. The district court hearing a petition by an
employer for an order restraining breach of a no-strike clause could grant the relief
pending an appearance by the Board (certain to be delayed). One court has already
denied a motion to stay a damage action for breach of a no-strike clause and a jurisdictional dispute governed by § 8 (b) (4) (D). L. R. Young Constr. Co. v. United Ass'n of
Journeymen, 33 CCH Lab. Cas. ,i 70,932 (E.D. Ill. 1957). Even if the reader were patient,
there is neither time nor space to develop these and related problems.
143 Under § 301: Mccarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.
2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
Under common law: General Elec. Co. v. International Union, UAW-CIO, 93 Ohio
App. 139, 108 N.E.2d 211 (1952), appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 555, 110 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
144 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
145 Mastro Plastics Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953).
146 214 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1954).
147 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
148 Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. I,
16-19 (1958).
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ise of good faith implicit in every agreement. This was a material
breach of contract. The union was privileged to elect non-performance of its obligation. Hardly a momentous result. It scarcely
warrants the Court's statement that only an express reservation
in the no-strike clause would hold it operative in the face of employer unfair labor practices.
It is one thing to discharge seventy-seven members who refuse to join the union an employer chooses; it is quite another
to discharge but one man. In Mid-West Metallic Products, Inc.,149
the employer discriminately discharged an employee one day. His
action prompted a strike in breach of a no-strike clause the next.
The employer discharged various strikers. The trial examiner,
after finding the initial discharge unlawful, concluded that the
remaining strikers protested an unfair labor practice, justifying
their action. All discharges violated section 8 (a) (3). The Board
agreed the discharge which started it all was unlawful; the other
discharges were not. But to rationalize this result with Mastro
Plastics is to put the square peg in a round hole. The Board noted
that the union had a perfectly ample way to remedy the discharge
in the grievance procedure, particularly since the grievance procedure required discharge cases to be processed in approximately
five days. The Board concluded that "unlike the union in the
Mastro Plastics case, the instant union did not jeopardize its very
existence by renouncing self-help against unfair labor practices for
a substantial period of time."150 The difficulty with this is that
Mastro Plastics too had a grievance procedure-an extremely broad
one.151 The real reason, of course, is that the single unfair labor
practice in Mid-West Metallic was minor compared to those in
Mastro Plastics.
Had the Board resorted to classic contract doctrine it could
easily have achieved the same result without its labored reasoning.
Not every breach of contract is a material breach which justifies
non-performance by the other party. If the agreement is partially
breached, then the wronged party seeks legal relief or, in this case,
the relief provided by contract. He is not privileged to rescind his
agreement unless the corresponding breach is material. Therefore,
in Mid-West Metallic Products, the Board could easily have reasoned that the discharge, albeit discriminatory, was a partial breach
of contract. The union was entitled to pursue the grievance pro149121 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1958).
150 Id. at 1320.
151103 NL.R.B. at 514-15.
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cedure and, if necessary, legal and equitable remedies. But the
breach was not such as to permit the union to avoid its undertaking
altogether. The agreement remained in effect and so did all of its
pertinent clauses.
Consider the reverse. Suppose a union threatens a new employee with loss of his job if he does not join the union in five days.
The agreement - and the law - give the employee thirty days.
The union has breached its agreement; it has also committed an
unfair labor practice.152 Yet no court would allow the employer to
rescind. Why? The breach is not material.
The point of all this is to emphasize the validity of conventional contract principles in analyzing breach of a no-strike clause.
Courts understand these principles. They are especially competent
to apply them. Moreover, these principles have served society well
for a number of years. They should hardly be discarded because
an industrial system provides new challenges to a traditional theory.
The ability of the common law to meet fresh tests is one of its finest
qualities. It doubtless prompted Mr. Justice Frankfurter to say:
"There is no reason for jettisoning principles of fairness
and justice that are as relevant to the law's attitude in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements as they are to
contracts dealing with other affairs, even giving due regard to
the circumstances of industrial life and to the libretto that this
furnishes in construing collective bargaining agreements. "153
VI.
One irony - at least - emerges from Lincoln Mills and Warrior. These decisions bring judges and lawyers back to an area
where for years the experts said they had no place. This is inescapable. Both cases present no mean problems in draftsmanship.
It is likely lawyers will do the drafting. And federal judges will
have to review their efforts.
Some will ·wring their hands over the appearance of the law on
sacrosanct land. I think their alarm illusory. The collective bargaining agreement has come of age. Its breach no longer needs the
care of a hothouse rose. Whatever may be said for solution of internal breaches of the agreement by expertise, external breaches
can and should be subject to traditional remedies that have worked
so well in the past. Of course, any private individual can "award"
152 Local 404, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 100 N.L.R.B. 801, Sll
153 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 475-76 (1960)

(1952).
(dissenting opinion).
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specific performance, damages, reformation, and rescission. The
difference is that courts can make them stick. And courts have
applied these remedies for years: to A's refusal to deliver his horse
to B as agreed, or to make X deliver two million dollars in products
to Y. These remedies have been applied by courts to breach of
contracts as vital to the signatories as any labor agreement. These
remedies are strict, and sometimes harsh, but they provide a foundation of respect for contracts an advanced society can hardly do
without. It is time they were equally applied to breach of labor
agreements. The forum to apply them is the court, for, as one
arbitrator has observed, "damages for strikes and lockouts in violation of the contract is a remedy normal to the courts - but not
to arbitration. When parties seek such extra-arbitral remedy, the
proper tribunal is, and has been, the courts - unless the contract
specifically authorizes the arbitrator to invoke such a remedy.... " 1114
Too much has been said of the dissimilarity of labor agreements
to ordinary contracts. Yet in one respect the collective labor agreement is vastly different from any other undertaking, and on this
difference the commentators are curiously silent. The labor agreement has a political importance that attaches to no other undertaking. Its negotiation is often trumpeted in the press. One side
or the other appeals for sympathy - and pressure - to anyone it
feels favorable - civic leaders, professors, the clergy. It is often the
result of a long and violent strike. Perhaps for this reason above all
Congress gave a non-elected judiciary the jurisdiction to hear suits
for their violation. It was a sensible choice. Naturally, federal
judges bring their disposition and capacities to the bench with
them. But more than any other, a federal judge is free from the
elective pressures that sway labor agencies and some state courts.
He has tenure for life and good behavior; he is adequately paid.
Unlike an arbitrator, he cannot be dismissed after an unfavorable
award. His job does not depend on the whim of anyone. He is the
ideal person to shape the law of breach of the labor agreement.
154 Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton

Corp., 30 Lab. Arb. 1061, 1064 (Arbitrator Crawford).

